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Examining the Ethics of Environmental Offsets:
A Response to Biocentric Objections to Biodiversity Offsetting
Meredyth Merrow*
Biodiversity is the totality of all inherited variation in the life forms of
Earth, of which we are one species. We study and save it to our great
benefit. We ignore and degrade it to our great peril.
- E. O. Wilson

I.

Introduction

Over the last two decades, biodiversity offsetting has become a
popular (and controversial) policy tool, designed to combat the destruction
of ecosystems for development projects by counterbalancing losses of
biodiversity in one place and generating equivalent biodiversity benefits in
another.1 As offset schemes become increasingly acceptable around the
world, environmental ethicists—particularly biocentrists—have raised
concerns about the moral implications of these programs. They maintain
that monetizing biodiversity, and thereby treating it as a tradable
commodity, leads to an erosion of ethical barriers, to the detriment of the
environment.2
In this paper, I critically examine the existing literature on the ethics
of environmental offsets and address two specific biocentric critiques of
biodiversity offsetting raised by Maron, Monbiot, Walker, Ives and
Bekessy. First, I address the argument that nature is not fungible, and
consider the challenges arising from assigning value to biodiversity. Next,
I assess the claim that biodiversity offsetting represents a shift in our ethical
approach to conservation, which may lead to a diminished sense of moral
duty and exacerbate environmental harm.3

* I would like to thank David Takacs for his infinite wisdom and unwavering support on a
subject that is near and dear to his heart. I would also like to thank Elizabeth Lockwood for
her keen insights and for the countless hours she spent discussing this topic with me.
1. Martine Maron, Christopher Ives, et al., Taming a Wicked Problem: Resolving
Controversies in Biodiversity Offsetting, 66 BIOSCI. 6, 489 (2016),
https://perma.cc/Y9TG-YVLA.
2. See generally, Christopher Ives & Sarah Bekessy, The Ethics of Offsetting
Nature, 13 FRONTIERS IN ECOLOGY & THE ENV’T, 568 (2015); Maron et al., supra note 1.
3. Ives & Bekessy, supra, note 2, at 568.
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I conclude that, instead of examining biodiversity offsetting as a
means of “conservation,”4 we should instead treat offsets within the context
of “development.” By evaluating the usefulness and appropriateness of
biodiversity offsets in the context of development, I resolve that
biodiversity offsetting does not facilitate the unraveling of our ethical
obligations to the natural world, but rather, cultivates a new responsibility
to the environment by imparting a previously-unrealized obligation to
preserve biodiversity in the context of development. By fostering this
obligation in development practices world-wide, we proliferate the ethic
that man does indeed have responsibilities to nature. If we are to
accommodate an estimated human population of eleven billion by 2100,
there is no getting around the need for additional development.5 We can
either meet this reality by implementing all the tools we have available to
us now, or we can resist and perish. By framing offsetting as a development
ethic, I believe we can channel our energies into making these programs
work more equitably for the human and nonhuman world.

II.

The Rise of Biodiversity Offsetting in Practice

Since the implementation of wetland mitigation banking under the
Clean Water Act in the United States in 1980,6 offset schemes have
expanded to account for impacts to a variety of environmental concerns,
including trades for habitat, species, and carbon.7 Biodiversity offsets are
defined as “conservation actions intended to compensate for the residual,
unavoidable harm to biodiversity caused by development projects, so as to
ensure no net loss of biodiversity.”8 As the impacts of climate change and
human pollution continue to degrade global ecosystems at an alarming rate,
the use of offsets to mitigate biodiversity losses has proliferated in recent

4. To the furor of environmental purists.
5. United Nations Dep’t of Econ. and Soc. Aff., Growing at a Slower Pace, World
Population is Expected to Reach 9.7 Billion in 2050 and Could Peak at Nearly 11 Billion
Around 2100 (June 17, 2019), https://perma.cc/K8ZJ-4699.
6. Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, U.S. EPA. (Apr. 2019), https://perma.cc/
6CRV-8BEP; see also, Wetlands Protection and Restoration, U.S. EPA. (Aug. 2018),
https://perma.cc/5FDQ-AFU3.
7. William Latimer & David Hill, Mitigation Banking: Securing No Net Loss to
Biodiversity?, FOREST TRENDS ASS’N. (date unknown), https://perma.cc/B92T-HCKC.
8. Biodiversity Offsets, INT’L UNION FOR CONSERVATION OF NATURE (Sept. 2016),
https://perma.cc/M9UZ-UD59 (emphasis added).
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years.9 As of 2015, “[a]t least fifty nations are currently implementing
biodiversity offsetting or have plans to do so.”10
Proponents of biodiversity offsets praise the programs for providing
a much needed balance between development and conservation, and for
offering a workable middle ground to appease governments,
environmentalists, developers, and policy-makers. They argue that
implementing biodiversity offsets as measures of “last resort” for
“unavoidable losses” of biodiversity can achieve “measurable conservation
outcomes.”11 Empirical evidence supports the fact that “in many cases,
even low-quality, incomplete, impermanent, poorly implemented
biodiversity offset approaches … provide more positive outcomes for
biodiversity than the status quo,” in which compensation for residual losses
of biodiversity is usually absent or inadequate.12
The goal of biodiversity offsetting is to achieve a “no net loss,” or
preferably, a “net gain,” of biodiversity “with respect to species
composition, habitat structure, ecosystem function and people’s use and
cultural values associated with biodiversity.”13 While national, regional,
and local practices vary in their implementation of biodiversity offsetting
programs, “one point is clear: offsetting is an increasingly important
mechanism for conservation as more companies use them to mitigate their
biodiversity impacts.”14
The uptake in international support and implementation of
biodiversity offsetting programs has raised some alarm for a number of
environmentalists. They argue that allowing developers to degrade
biodiversity in one place, in exchange for paying to protect biodiversity
elsewhere, creates an unethical conservation framework wherein nature can
be bought, bartered, and sold.15 Critics of biodiversity offsetting argue that
once the principle of commodifying nature is established, nature will
9. Ives & Bekessy, supra note 2, at 568.
10. David Takacs, Are Koalas Fungible? Biodiversity Offsetting and the Law, 26
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 2, 165–66 (2018), https://perma.cc/7JAK-4HMQ.
11. Jonathan Ekstrom et al., Independent Report on Biodiversity Offsets, INT’L
COUNCIL ON MINING & METALS (Jan. 7, 2013), https://perma.cc/KT2D-CDMD.
12. Technical Conditions for Positive Outcomes from Biodiversity Offsets, INT’L
UNION FOR CONSERVATION OF NATURE (2014), https://perma.cc/SF54-EZ5E.
13. Ekstrom et al., supra note 11.
14. Carlos Ferreira, Biodiversity Offsets As Corporate Responsibility: Opportunity
or Paradox?, ECOSYSTEM MARKETPLACE (Dec. 2, 2014), https://perma.cc/6Y46-GH9U.
15. See generally Ives & Bekessy, supra note 2, at 568; Susan Walker, Ann Brower,
R.T. Theo Stephens & William G. Lee, Why Bartering Biodiversity Fails, 2 CONSERVATION
LETTERS 149, 150 (2009), https://perma.cc/VS9S-TMD8; George Monbiot, Putting a Price
on Rivers and Rain Diminishes Us All, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 6, 2012), https://perma.cc
/DAT8-8MJ6.
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become as “fungible as everything else.”16 Further, they raise concerns that
the adoption of biodiversity offsetting represents an ethical shift away from
traditional regulatory approaches to conservation, which prohibit certain
actions according to clearly defined statutes, to a lawless free-for-all, where
developers can devastate remarkable places with impunity and absolution,
as long as they offset the harm somewhere else.17

III.

Responding to Biocentric Critiques of Biodiversity
Offsetting

Since the introduction of biodiversity offsetting as a regulatory
incentive mechanism, environmental ethicists have grappled with its
implications. According to research ecologists Martine Maron and
Christopher Ives (“Maron, et al.”), most ethical objections to offsetting are
born from a biocentric view of the world.18 Biocentrists maintain that all
living things have intrinsic value, apart from any instrumental value they
might have to humans. Unlike the ethic of anthropocentrism, which holds
that human beings are the primary holders of moral standing, biocentrism
extends moral status to all living things. Thus, for biocentrists, biodiversity
offsetting’s “reduc[tion of] nature to exchangeable units is a fundamental
violation of its intrinsic value.”19
Due to the extensive commentary that flows from the ethical
implications of offset schemes, I will address only two such critiques. First,
I examine the biocentric contention that nature is not fungible, and thus,
that biodiversity offsetting is immoral; and second, I address the claim that
the increased implementation of biodiversity offsetting will lead to a
decreased sense of moral duty to nature.20
1.

Nature as Fungible

Biocentrists argue that biodiversity offsetting represents a
“dangerous” “license to destroy;” in that they commodify the natural world
and allow for the trashing of precious places to accommodate the
construction of unremarkable projects that could be built elsewhere.21
According to The Guardian columnist George Monbiot, biodiversity
offsetting

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

18

Monbiot, supra note 15.
Ives & Bekessy, supra note 2, at 570; Monbiot, supra note 15.
Maron et al., supra note 1, at 491.
Id.
See generally, Ives & Bekessy, supra note 2.
Monbiot, supra note 15.
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makes nature as fungible as everything else. No place is valued
as a place: it is broken down into a list of habitats and animals and
plants, which could, in theory, be shifted somewhere else. It
subjects our landscape and wildlife to the same process of
commodification that has blighted everything else the corporate
economy touches…22
Monbiot maintains that by accepting the principle of biodiversity
offsetting, “you accept the idea that place means nothing. That nowhere is
to be valued in its own right … that everything is exchangeable for
everything else, and nothing can be allowed to stand in the way of the
graders and degraders.”23 To Monbiot—and to many environmental
advocates—this idea is not easy to “swallow.”24
These arguments reflect a fundamental aversion to market-based
conservation schemes because they “are incongruous with nature’s intrinsic
value.”25 In a sense, I also concede to this view. The underlying notion of
trading, or “bartering,” nature is, to me, personally and fundamentally
objectionable. There is a holiness in the quiet forest floor of the Great North
Woods. I stand in awe beneath the towering trees in the Redwood National
and State Parks. I hold tight to cherished memories of swimming in the
chilly waters of the Androscoggin River on a hot summer’s day. There is
intangible, and arguably incalculable, value in a place simply as a place—
just as there is value in home, in family, or in love. Despite the
inexpressible sense of wonder I derive from the natural world and the
significance of these places in my own life, I am under no illusions that
these places are not also external commodities. The reality is that, “[n]ature
really may not be fungible—but if large chunks of nonhuman nature and
functioning ecosystems are to survive, we likely must pretend it is.”26
Nature has been monetized, prioritized, and commodified since man
first “confused [his] human uniqueness with superiority,” and declared
nature as under his dominion.27 When mankind entered into societal
contracts with other humans, everything was assigned a price—either in
money or in value. Men traded seeds for cattle, traded cattle for food, sold
food for coin, which could then be exchanged again for any number of
goods. William Cronon illustrates the commodification of nature,

22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Ives & Bekessy, supra note 2, at 568.
26. Tackacs, supra note 10, at 165-66.
27. Elizabeth Dodson Gray, Come Inside the Circle of Creation: The Ethic of
Attunement, in ETHICS AND ENVTL. POLICY: THEORY MEETS PRACTICE 21, 22 (Frederick
Ferré & Peter Hartel eds., 1994).
19
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specifically of wilderness by the elite, in the decades following the Civil
War, writing:
more and more of the nation’s wealthiest citizens [sought] out
wilderness for themselves. The elite passion for wild land took
many forms: enormous estates in the Adirondacks and
elsewhere…cattle ranches for would-be rough riders on the Great
Plains, guided big-game hunting trips to the Rockies, and
luxurious resort hotels wherever railroads pushed their way into
sublime landscapes. Wilderness suddenly emerged as a landscape
of choice for elite tourists, who brought with them strikingly urban
ideas of the countryside through which they traveled. For them,
wild land was not a site for productive labor and not a permanent
home; rather, it was a place of recreation. One went to the
wilderness not as a producer but a consumer…28
Ignoring the unpleasant reality that nature has been, and will continue to
be, commodified, classified, and monetized, ultimately gets us nowhere.29
Furthermore, those who maintain that attaching an economic value to
nature necessarily diminishes it, overlook the fact that assigning a numeric
value to aspects of the natural world can also highlight their significance.
Even the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)—the internationally
binding treaty created to promote and conserve the sustainable use, and
equitable sharing of biodiversity—quantifies and qualifies biodiversity’s
importance by noting that
at least 40 per cent of the world’s economy, and 80 per cent of the
needs of the poor, are derived from biological resources. In
addition, the richer the diversity of life, the greater the opportunity
for medical discoveries, economic development, and adaptive
responses to such new challenges as climate change.30
Assigning a numeric attachment to the significance of biodiversity can also
mobilize different sectors of the population that might otherwise be
disinterested in its protection. For example, the pollination of food crops
of bees and other insects is “a service worth as much as $500 billion every

28. WILLIAM CRONON, UNCOMMON GROUND: RETHINKING THE HUMAN PLACE IN
NATURE 78 (1996).
29. If we didn’t accept this premise to some extent, private property rights would not
exist.
30. United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M 818,
1760 U.N.T.S. 79, https://perma.cc/S3FM-HFGN.
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year.”31 The destruction of biodiversity has far-reaching implications on
individuals, businesses, states, and the planet. In a perfect world, the loss
of biodiversity as an intrinsically valuable entity in and of itself would be
enough to garner unwavering support for its preservation; but, in reality,
monetizing nature can help attract players that would otherwise ignore its
significance.

a) Assigning Value to Biodiversity
If we accept that—despite our own misgivings—nature must be
treated as fungible if we hope to meet any conservation goals, the issue then
becomes how we should evaluate the worth, or “value,” of biodiversity, so
that it can be traded fairly and effectively in offsetting schemes.
Biodiversity, unlike a single seed, animal, or object presents unique
challenges for valuation because of its inherent complexity. Ecosystems
specifically, are “place-specific and dynamic: each is unique and
irreplaceable.”32 Further, ecosystems (and the biodiversity within those
ecosystems) contain interweaving functions, processes, and living beings,
that coexist and operate symbiotically within the surrounding environment.
The considerable and obvious challenges of assigning a numerical
value to such an intricate system cannot be ignored. Even determining how
to break down such an interconnected system into a series of isolated and
distinct components is problematic. When assessing the value of each
individual component, we must first consider whose value assessments
should factor into the equation. How do we weigh the values of contracting
parties and the values of the public? How do we measure the
immeasurable? How can we put a price on the priceless?33

b) Creating a Scientifically-Defensible Currency
Those ethically or technically opposed to biodiversity offsets argue
that “protecting biodiversity in trading is neither technically realistic nor
administratively probable.”34 They maintain that trading in a “complex,
noninterchangeable and poorly measurable resource such as biodiversity”
ensures “inadequate currency, exchange restrictions, and review, to the
detriment of that resource.”35

31. Brooke Jarvis, The Insect Apocalypse Is Here, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 27, 2018),
https://perma.cc/XV24-6YPV.
32. Tackacs, supra note 10, at 189.
33. Id. at 221.
34. Walker et al., supra note 15, at 150.
35. Id.
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According to Walker, Browner, Stephens and Lee (“Walker et al.”),
“[v]iable biodiversity barter and meaningful biodiversity protection seem
mutually exclusive.”36 They maintain that the absence of credible solutions
to the problems biodiversity offsetting raises presents a situation where
“[w]e can achieve one or the other, but not both.”37 Their arguments
suggest that to create a workable, functioning exchange program, simple
currencies are necessary, and biodiversity’s complexity cannot be
quantified into a single unit.38 Additionally, due to the uneven playing field
between developer, government, and public interests, without a universal
exchange policy, biodiversity offsetting will “be more vulnerable to the
institutional failings that undermine environmental protection than
simple…prohibitions.”39
Salzman and Ruhl noted that the test of a currency’s adequacy is
whether it “can capture the significant values exchanged or [if] some
important features remain external to the trades.”40 Unlike other easily
measured environmental offset schemes, such as carbon offsets,
biodiversity’s intricate entanglement of functions, processes, ecosystems,
and life forms, make effective value assessments uniquely puzzling. The
goal is to create a scientifically defensible measurement that captures “what
we care about.”41
To make biodiversity offsetting a viable trading program, “currencies
must be simple, review cannot be onerous, and restrictions must be
straightforward and few.”42 This makes biodiversity offsetting additionally
problematic, as creating a value currency to facilitate trade involves many
(often competing) interests, value assessments, and scientific data.
Furthermore, proposed project developers, who fund the scientific data in
most biodiversity offset schemes, are more interested in seeing the project
built than they are concerned about the loss of biodiversity associated with
the project.
Walker, et al. note that, “if ‘what we care about’ is persistence of the
full variety of life, contributions of different biodiversity elements are
noninterchangeable.”43 While I concede that the nontransferable quality of
biodiversity makes it impossible to trade in the exact sense, formulating

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
22

Id. at 155.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 151.
Id.
Id. at 153.
Id. at 150.
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value assessments of ecosystems is possible, and should be fashioned,
however imperfectly.
Determining the worth of something is usually personal and
subjective. Indeed, sometimes we have trouble communicating our own
value assessments to others or understanding the logic behind the values
we hold. I acknowledge that, although offsets may never fully reflect the
value of an ecosystem’s biodiversity to all human and non-human entities,
if we are to implement biodiversity offsetting in the most effective way
possible, incorporating the value assessments of as many parties as possible
is imperative. Because biodiversity trading affects interests beyond those
of the direct participants, implementing offsets without public participation
can (and will) erode the public’s interest in public resources.44 However,
adopting biodiversity offsetting legislation at the regional, national, and
international levels that contain clear guidelines, allowances, and
restrictions will result in better conservation outcomes. Additionally, by
mandating the incorporation of language that requires the participation of
all affected parties in the negotiations of offsetting programs, it is possible
to create a “rubric” for assessing the value of an ecosystem. I acknowledge
that such a rubric will undoubtedly have its problems—especially at the
implementation phase45 —and will not adequately reflect some individuals’
value assessments. However, the hope is that over time this rubric will
morph into an equitable and workable measurement tool. The reality is, we
will not know what works if we do not try.

2. The Increased Implementation of Biodiversity
Offsetting Will Not Lead to a Decreased Sense of Moral
Duty to Nature, Unless We Let it.
Ives and Bekessy contend that biodiversity offsetting “represents a
major shift in how nature is protected.”46 They claim that by focusing on
the outcomes of certain acts, instead of the acts themselves, biodiversity
offsetting diverges from the traditional justification for biodiversity
legislation. They argue that traditional environmental legislation is most
strongly supported by a deontological view of the world.47 They frame
44. Id. at 151 (citing Bo Gustafsson, Scope and Limits of the Market Mechanism in
Environmental Management, 24 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 259 (1998); James Salzman & J. B.
Ruhl, Currencies and the Commodification of Environmental Law, 53 STAN. L. REV. 607
(2000); Timm Kroeger & Frank A. Casey, An Assessment of Market-Based Approahes to
Providing Ecosystem Services on Agricultural Lands, 64 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 321 (2007)).
45. Not to mention the challenges presented in an attempt to get such legislation
passed.
46. Ives & Bekessy, supra note 2, at 568.
47. Id.
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deontology as “the moral concept that people should not harm biodiversity,
or the integrity of the environment should be upheld.”48 Other
environmental theorists, such as Maron et. al., allege that “offset exchanges
seem to imply an acceptance of an anthropocentric philosophy and a focus
on use or existence values” that are otherwise absent from traditional
environmental legislation.49
While I accept that in its current structure biodiversity offsetting is
less about statutory allowances or restrictions on specific conduct, I do not
agree that this change reflects a departure from traditional ethical principles
or that it will erode our sense of obligation to the natural world. In
evaluating this position, I turn to the Endangered Species Act (ESA)—
considered to be the most comprehensive environmental law in the world—
which uses explicit statutory restrictions and allowances to achieve the
ultimate goal of protecting endangered and threatened species. Ives and
Bekessy consider the ESA an example of “traditional biodiversity
legislation” because it clearly allows for certain actions and explicitly
prohibits others (such as the “taking” of an endangered species).50
When Congress passed the ESA in 1973, it recognized that “species
of fish, wildlife, and plants are of esthetic, ecological, educational,
recreational, and scientific value to the Nation and its people.”51 As noted
by the Supreme Court in Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, the legislative
proceedings of the ESA are “replete with expressions of concern over the
risk that might lie in the loss of any endangered species.”52 The
legislature’s concern over the loss of species is best summarized by the
legislative history leading up to the ESA’s passage in 1973,53 which
provides:
As we homogenize the habitats in which these plants and
animals evolved, and as we increase the pressure for products that
they are in a position to supply (usually unwillingly) we threaten
their—and our own—genetic heritage. The value of this genetic
heritage is, quite literally, incalculable.54

48. Id.
49. Maron et al., supra note 1, at 491 (citing James Justus et al., Buying into
Conservation: Instrinsic Versus Instrumental Value, 24 TRENDS IN ECOLOGY & EVOLUTION
187 (2009)).
50. Ives & Bekessy, supra note 2, at 569.
51. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(3) (1973).
52. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 177, (1978).
53. Id. at 177-78.
54. Id. at 178.
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Although many consider the ESA to be the most “radical” environmental
law in existence, it was born from a self-interested anthropocentric view of
nature.55 The legislature noted that genetic variations of plants, fish and
wildlife are “potential resources” to human beings. “They are keys to
puzzles which we cannot solve, and they may provide answers to questions
which we have not yet learned to ask.”56
Who knows, or can say, what potential cures for cancer or
other scourges, present or future, may lie locked up in the
structures of plants which may yet be undiscovered, much less
analyzed? . . . Sheer self-interest impels us to be cautious.57
All environmental laws, regardless of their effectiveness in protecting or
conserving nature, are born from an anthropocentric self-interest.
Similarly, any and all value assessments we place on the natural world are
still human constructs. To argue that biodiversity offsets somehow alter
this established paradigm ignores these established truths.
Critics of biodiversity offsetting rightfully reject its label as a
“conservation” tool when it should be treated as a new development ethic.
For example, critics have noted the problems with the symbolic policy
language of “no net loss” and “net gain”;58 reasoning that, “while
compensation and no net loss are worthy goals, and bartering biodiversity
might appear more promising than simple and weakly enforced
prohibitions … policies that enable biodiversity trading may perversely
yield worse biodiversity outcomes.”59
Framing biodiversity offsets as a “conservation tool” is categorically
misleading. Claiming that offsets result in “no net loss” or a “net gain” in
biodiversity is similarly disingenuous—particularly because there is
currently no effective means of measuring biodiversity’s value. Ives and
Bekessy argue that “[a]llowing for the buying and selling of nature may
counteract the development of respectful, positive societal attitudes toward
nature.”60 They claim that “[w]hile offsetting might make it economically
less viable to destroy biodiversity, it rests on the assumption that there is

55. The legislative history of the ESA specifically notes that “it is in the best
interests of mankind to minimize the losses of genetic variations” because of the value
such genetic variations potentially offer human beings. (quoting Tenn. Valley Auth., 437
U.S. 153, at 178).
56. See id. (quoting H.R. 37).
57. Id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 93-412, at 4-5 (1973)).
58. Walker et al., supra note 15, at 154-55.
59. Id. at 155.
60. Ives & Bekessy, supra note 2, at 572.
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nothing wrong per se with the manipulation and trading of nature, and may
therefore undermine [respect for nature as] a virtue.”61
Because I maintain, albeit regrettably, that man has already
commodified nature since he entered into societal contracts, to frame
biodiversity offsets in the language of development—rather than in the
language of conservation—creates a new, previously unaccepted
development ethic. Instead of simply destroying nature for the sake of
development, as we have for millennia, the practice of biodiversity
offsetting represents a shift toward fostering an ethic of obligation to
consider and conserve ecosystems during development. Instead of
demonizing the trading scheme as immoral, we should instead celebrate the
genesis of this newly-minted obligation to the natural world. Rather than
assuming that the implementation of offsetting diminishes humanity’s
responsibilities to nature, we should champion the ethic that we are
obligated to enhance nature whenever we destroy it.
“Rather than sink into a mire of despair,” seeing “biodiversity
offsetting as one element of hopeful, sound, savvy planning [that could]
carry humans and nonhumans with which we share the planet into the
Anthropocene” seems, to me, the better option.62
Incorporating
biodiversity offsetting into the plans for development projects would help
reinforce mankind’s obligations to nature. Additionally, focusing on
incorporating nature into all development plans—such as building green
spaces into development projects—would further nurture mankind’s
connection and relationship to the natural world.63 I do not pretend that the
implementation of this practice will not come without many technical and
social challenges. I also recognize the very real fundamental imbalance of
power and interests in the marketplace which can provide “another transfer
of power to corporations and the very rich,” if we let transfers go
unchecked.64 However, the rising popularity of biodiversity offsetting
gives me hope. Although it arguably reinforces the idea that nature is
fungible, it also codifies a renewed obligation and responsibility to the
natural world that was altogether absent from the development practices of
the modern world. If biodiversity truly is “the key to the maintenance of
the world as we know it,”65 by refocusing our energies and harnessing our
collective power to progress change, biodiversity offsets are a beacon of
light in an otherwise dark and dismal future.

61. Id.
62. Takacs, supra note 10, at 198.
63. See generally, Holly Doremus, Biodiversity and the Challenge of Saving the
Ordinary, 38 IDAHO L. REV. 325 (2002), https://perma.cc/R67T-ZS9J.
64. Monbiot, supra note 15.
65. EDWARD O. WILSON, DIVERSITY OF LIFE, 15 (1992).
26

